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THE IMPACT OF MORRISSEY AND GAGNON ON PAROLE REVOCATION
PROCEEDINGS*
VINCENT O'LEARY** AND KATHLEEN HANRAHAN***
Prior to 1960, following an established "hands-
off" doctrine, courts were reluctant to intervene in
the affairs of the correctional system.' Then,
spurred by a series of Supreme Court decisions in
the early 1960s, the lower courts altered their
stance.2 The change occurred slowly at first, but
continued with increasing vigor until virtually all
aspects of the correctional system had been sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny.3 Clearly the scope of
court activity in the past decade has been dramatic.
Whatever the direction or dimension of future legal
rulings, the time is ripe to assess the effectiveness of
that activity. To that end, this article attempts to
trace the impact of two important Supreme Court
decisions on one segment of the correctional sys-
tem-parole.
The future of the institution of parole today is
uncertain. In several states, proposals are before
legislatures to modify parole practice substantially
or eliminate it entirely. In one state, parole has
* The material for this article was collected as part of
the 1975-76 series of National Parole Institutes. Support
for that project, which was administered by the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, was supplied by
Grant #D-120, 73-ED-99-0019 from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration, which was sponsored by the National Institute of
Corrections. The opinions stated in this article are those
of the writers and do not necessarily represent those of
L.E.A.A. or the National Institute of Corrections.
** Acting President, State University of New York at
Albany.
*** Research Associate.
' For a discussion of the "hands-off" doctrine, see Notes
and Comments, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YAI.-
L.J. 506 (1963).
2 The exact point at which the court system reversed
its position is difficult to determine. Sullivan and Tifft
locate the shift in opinion in the Warren Court "with the
determination that 'critical stages' are not only preadju-
dicatory stages." Sullivan & Tifft, Court Intervention in
Correction-Roots of Resistance and Problems of Compliance, 21
CRIME AND DFLINQUENCY 213, 215 n.10 (1975).
:'For a review of some of the areas of court review, see
Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole Process, 36 ALBANY
L. Rrv 257 (1972); Plotkin, Recent Developments in the Law
f Prnoners' Rights, I1 CRIM. L. BULL. 405 (1975); and
Note, Decency and Fairnesi: An Emerging Judicial Role in
Prison Refjrm, 57 VA L. REv. 841 (1971).
been abolished,4 and in another it has been dra-
matically curtailed.5 However, it is not our purpose
here to assess development in parole and sentencing
theory and practice.6 The fact that the agencies
under analysis are parole boards is incidental.
What is important is that we have an opportunity
to study the response of an important set of crimi-
nal justice agencies to significant judicial rulings.
Parole was relatively late in receiving attention
from the courts, and, as noted by Newman, 7 they
did not treat it as a unitary whole. Rather, the
courts responded to separable elements of the pa-
role process: the grant hearing, the conditions of
supervision and revocation. Of these elements,
revocation has received the most extensive and
detailed court regulation. Within one year, the
Supreme Court handed down decisions in Morrissey
v. Brewer8 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.9
In Morrissey,'° the Court set aside the traditional
right/privilege distinction in parole litigation. It
declared that liberty was at stake in revocation
proceedings and "must be seen as within the pro-
tection of the Fourteenth Amendment."'1 The
Court then established the now familiar two-stage
process for revocation of parole.'
2
4 ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 47-53 (1976).
5 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1139.
6 For a discussion of these issues, see, V. O'LEAR" & K
HANRAHAN, PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STAIES
(1976) and O'Leary, Gottfredson, & Gelman, Contemporary
Sentencing Proposals, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 555 (1975).
7 Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole Process, 36
ALBANY L. REV. 257, 261 (1972).
8 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
9 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
to Morrissey, an Iowa parolee originally convicted on
bad check charges, was returned to prison accused of
violating several of the conditions of his parole by alleg-
edly buying a car and obtaining credit under an assumed
name, failing to report his place of residence to his parole
officer and giving false information about his address and
insurance company to the police after an accident. He
was granted no hearing until two months after his parole
was revoked. Morrissey filed a writ of habeas corpus
claiming that he had been denied due process because he
had received no hearing prior to the revocation of his
parole.
" 408 U.S. at 482.
12 Id. at 484-89.
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The first stage of that process consists of a pre-
liminary hearing held at or reasonably near the
place of the alleged parole violation. The hearing
is to be conducted "as promptly as convenient after
arrest while information is fresh and sources are
available."' 3 Its purpose is to determine if there is
probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe
that a violation of parole has occurred. The hearing
is to be conducted by an individual not directly
involved in the case, and the parolee is to receive
advance written notice of the hearing, its purpose.
and the parole violations which are alleged. At the
hearing, the parolee may present letters, documents
and individuals with relevant information and,
upon his request, individuals who have supplied
information adverse to his case are to be made
available for questioning in his presence. 14 The
individual conducting the hearing is to prepare a
summary of the proceedings. If probable cause is
found the parolee may be returned to an institution
to await the final revocation proceeding.
The second stage, the final revocation hearing,
is held to evaluate any contested facts and to
determine if the facts warrant revocation. This
hearing is to be conducted by a "neutral and
detached" hearing body such as a parole board.'5
The procedures for notice, evidence and confron-
tation are substantially the same as those of the
preliminary hearing. In addition, the evidence
against the parolee must be disclosed to him and
the hearing body must prepare a written statement
of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
revocation of parole.
Chief among the issues left unresolved by Mor-
rissey were attorney representation at revocation
hearings and the appointment of counsel for indi-
gent parolees. Although both Justice Brennan in
his concurring opinion and Justice Douglas in his
partial dissent supported attorney representation, 6
the holding in Morrissey specifically did not address
the question. The issue was positively resolved
subsequently in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.17 Although the
13 Id. at 485.
" If the preliminary hearing officer determines that
the informant would be subject to risk of harm if identi-
fied, he or she need not be made available for cross-
examination. Id. at 487.
is Id. at 489.
6 Id. at 491,498.
17 Scarpelli, while on probation in Wisconsin for an
armed robbery conviction, was charged with subse-
quently committing a burglary for which his probation
was revoked without a hearing. Scarpelli applied for a
writ of habeas corpus claiming that revocation of pro-
bation without a hearing and without counsel was a
denial of due process.
Court permitted parole authorities to decide
whether to allow counsel at specific revocation
hearings, it also established the following presump-
tive criteria:
[Ojounsel should be provided in cases where, after
being informed of his right to request counsel, the
probationer or parolee makes such a request, based
on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not
committed the alleged violation of the conditions
upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the
violation is a matter or public record or is uncon-
tested, there are substantial reasons which justified
or mitigated the violation and make revocation in-
appropriate, and that the reasons are complex or
otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing
on a request for the appointment of counsel, the
responsible agency also should consider, especially
in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears
to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In
every case in which a request for counsel at a prelim-
inary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for
refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.18
Measuring Reaction to Morrissey and Gagnon
The Court's imposition of procedural require-
ments before revocation raised two related sets of
concerns, particularly with respect to Morrissey. The
first concern was the burden to the parole system
that implementation of the decision might entail.
Many feared that the added procedural require-
ments would create cost problems for parole ad-
ministration and would serve to restrict parole
personnel. Some suggested that the net result might
be a decrease in the number of inmates paroled. 9
The second set of concerns arose with regard to
compliance. Open evasion of the ruling was not
anticipated, but there was some skepticism about
the degree and nature of implementation of the
procedural requirements. Similar efforts of the
Court, notably Mapp,2° Miranda2 ' and Gault22 had
not been greeted by the affected agencies with
enthusiastic compliance.2 3 A common concern was
that implementation of Morrissey would be more
symbolic than operational, possibly through the
use of waiveru and other evasive techniques.
18411 U.S. at 790-91.
19 See, e.g., PRESIDENTi-S COMMISSION ON LAw EN-
FORCEMENiT AND ADMINIS'RIRAION OF JuSTIcE, TASK
FORCE REORT: CORR-c'IONS, 83-84 (1967).
20 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23 For a brief description of the literature on non-
compliance with these rulings, see Sullivan & Tiffi, supra
note 2, at 218-19.
24 Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process
and Parole Revocation, 8 CRim. L. BuL. 616,620-21 (1972).
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Similar issues could be raised with respect to the
Gagnon ruling. However, that decision lacks the
specificity of Morrissey. The Court recognized that
"considerable discretion must be allowed the re-
sponsible agency in making the decision
' 'ss about
the need for attorney representation during parole
revocation.
In spite of the interest in implementation of the
Court's rulings, national data on the compliance
of parole boards with Morrissey and Gagnon has been
largely unavailable. In 1973, the American Bar
Association attempted to collect information on
:ompliance with Morrissey,
2s but was unable to
elicit the cooperation of all parole boards. The
results of that survey, based upon the responses of
forty-five paroling authorities, indicated that:
[M]ost of [the boards] are in formal compliance with
most of the Morrissey requirements. The pattern of
compliance is highest with respect to those due
process elements which are most certain and specific
(e.g. written notice of charges, right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, etc.). Concerning
issues such as the promptness of the revocation hear-
ing, parole board practices are more diverse.
27
The report of the ABA also noted some variation
in the boards' approach to the spirit of the deci-
sion28 and expressed concern with the issue of
waiver.29 Emphasizing the preliminary nature of
its findings, the ABA study suggested that "Morris-
sey has had the effect of 'shaking up' many parole
practices and it will be some time before the dust
finally settles."
' 3
In the four years since Morrissey, there have been
significant changes in revocation procedures. Some
records of those changes are available through two
surveys of parole practices conducted by the Na-
tional Parole Institutes.
3
' The first was conducted
in 1972 shortly before the Supreme Court decided
Morrissey. Detailed questionnaires were mailed to
fifty-four adult paroling authorities,3 and a de-
n 4 11 U.S. at 790.
26ABA SURVEY OF PAROLE REVOCATION PROCE-
DURES (1973). The survey also included items on attorney
representation, but these data pre-date the Gagnon ruling.27 Id. at 1.
2 Id. at 8.
29 Id. at 9.
"oId. at 7-8.
3' The National Parole Institutes are federally funded
training programs for parole board members, adminis-
tered by the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency.
3 The 54jurisdictions included the adult parole boards
of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Federal
board and specialized boards in two states.
scription of each board was developed from the
"responses. Once the descriptions had been verified
by each board, they were compiled and pub-
fished,as preserving a detailed description of pre-
Morrissey and Gagnon revocation procedures.
Due to the changes that have occurred in parole
since 1972, and the current interest in the parole
process, a similar project was undertaken by the
writers in 1976. Fifty-two4 adult parole boards
were contacted and asked to update the 1972 de-
scription of their practices and to complete a ques-
tionnaire concerning revocation procedures. Final
drafts of each board's description were mailed for
verification in June of 19 76 ."s
An additional source of information on board
reactions to Morrissey.and Gagnon is the Parole Board
Opinion Survey mailed to all board members and
chairpersons in the United States early in the
summer of 1976, under the auspices of the National
Parole Institutes. This survey contained a set of
items concerning attitudes toward attorney repre-
sentation at revocation hearings, and a set of items
concerning attitudes toward selected elements of
the Morrissey decision and its perceived impact on
the revocation process. At this time, approximately
two-thirds of the 273 board personnel
36 who re-
ceived the Survey have responded.
Compliance with Morrissey and Gagnon
Prior to the Morrissey and Gagnon decisions, the
majority of states returned parolees suspected of
parole violation to the institutions from which they
had been released, or to some other state facility.
Only seven boards held the revocation hearing
locally near the site of the alleged violation. And
as Table 1 demonstrates, the hearings given did
not comply with a number of specific requirements
of Morrissey and Gagnon.
These deviations from the requirements of Gag-
non and Morrissey obviously required changes in
3 V. O'LEARY & J. NUFFIELD, THE ORGANIZATION
OF PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1972).
"4 Additional specialized boards in two states which
were included in the 1972 survey were excluded from the
recent survey. In the sections that follow, those two
boards are eliminated from the 1972 data to permit
comparison with the recent information.
The information was collected during the recent
series of National Parole Institutes. The full results are
presented in V. O'LEARY & K. HANRAHAN, PAROLE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
-1 The survey was mailed to the members and chair-
persons of the 50 state adult boards, the District of
Columbia, the Federal Parole Commission, and three
specialized hoards in California.
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Table 1




Notice of specific charges 34 18
Disclosure of violation reports 18 34
Counsel permitted at hearing 37 15
Parolee allowed witnesses 32 20
Parolee allowed to confront opposing. 28 24
witnesses
Reasons for the decision recorded 4 48
Table 2
Average Time Between the Arrest or Detention of the




1 to 2 weeks
2 to 3 weeks
3 to 4 weeks
90 days







practice in a number of jurisdictions. The results
of the 1976 survey suggest that parole boards did
make those changes. All fifty-two boards reported
compliance with the requirements of a two-tiered
revocation process, notice, presentation of wit-
nesses, confrontation of adverse witnesses and a
summary of the preliminary revocation hearing.
Other procedural requirements established in
Morrissey and Gagnon are of a less specific nature
than those listed in the survey. For instance, the
Court held in Morrissey that the preliminary revo-
cation hearing was to be conducted "as promptly
as convenient after arrest while information is fresh
and sources are available."' ' As demonstrated by
Table 2, this time period has been interpreted
differently, and in one case literally, but most
boards hold the hearing within two weeks of the
parolee's arrest or detention.
The Court was also non-specific in setting stan-
dards for the nature of hearing bodies at prelimi-
nary and final revocation proceedings. The prelim-
inary hearing is to be conducted by someone not
3 408 U.S. at 485.
directly involved in the case, "such as a parole
officer other than the one who has made the report
of parole violations or has recommended revoca-
tion.' 'ss Similarly, the final hearing is to be con-
ducted by a "neutral and detached" hearing body
such as a traditional parole board.39
Parole boards have developed a variety of ways
to meet the requirements. In twenty-three jurisdic-
tions, the preliminary hearing is conducted by
parole staff of various supervisory positions. Nine-
teen boards delegate that duty to hearing officers
attached to the board."° Of the remaining jurisdic-
tions, four boards have delegated the preliminary
hearing to hearing officers of other state depart-
-8 Id. at 486.
39 Id. at 489.
'0 While the titles vary across jurisdictions, hearing
officer, as used in this report, refers to a specific and
formal position whose job description includes conduct-
ing hearings as a board representative. Several states refer
to the parole staff who conduct revocation hearings as
"hearing officers"; we have attempted to distinguish
between those less formal designations and the formal
positions in the course of the survey.
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Table 3


























a. In Alaska the Executive Director of the Board may conduct
hearings.
b. Colorado: Court of Record; Ohio: the attorney for the Parole
Board; New Hampshire: either parole or probation supervisory
staff.
c. Oklahoma: the Deputy Director of the Division of Community
Services and Legal Aid; Ohio: either three Board members or
one board member and two hearing officers.
ments,41 one board to probation staff and three
boards to others.
Final revocation hearings are typically con-
ducted by either the full board (fourteen jurisdic-
tions) or some part of the board (thirty jurisdic-
tions). In at least six jurisdictions, the hearings are
conducted by board hearing officers. Two boards
have developed alternate hearing bodies as indi-
cated in Table 3.
The revocation questionnaire included two ad-
ditional questions bearing on the Morrissey require-
ments. The first concerned disclosure of the evi-
dence against the parolee. Boards were asked if
they permitted the parolee direct access to perti-
nent official records prior to revocation hearings.
It was thought that this item was broader than the
Morrissey requirement of disclosure,4 2 since Morrissey
could be met in a number of ways, including a
verbal description of evidence upon which the
violation charges rested. The majority of boards
reported that they do permit direct access to official
materials. Twenty-eight boards usually do so prior
to the preliminary hearing and two additional
boards permit the parolee access to official mate-
rials if they feel it is advisable. Prior to the final
hearing, thirty-four boards allow the parolee to
view relevant official materials. This is a rather
4' Again, these hearing officers are distinct from the
hearing officers attached to the parole boards.
42 408 U.S. at 489.
substantial increase over the practice in 1972. At
that time, only eighteen boards permitted the pa-
rolee to read the violation report prior to the
revocation hearing.
The second item concerned the means by which
reasons for the revocation decisions were transmit-
ted to parolees. Morrissey requires "a written state-
ment by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole. 43 Boards were
asked if the parolee received an explanation of the
reasons for the decision, either verbally, in writing,
or both. While most would interpret the Court's
holding as requiring a written statement, appar-
ently not all paroling authorities agree with that
interpretation. All jurisdictions reported providing
an explanation of the decision, but six of those
boards provided the explanation verbally.
It was assumed that parole boards would comply
with the letter of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, since the Court
established a case by case procedure relying only
on the "sound discretion" of the agency adminis-
tering the parole system. Therefore, each paroling
authority was not asked if it fulfilled the require-
ments of Gagnon, but rather if it permitted attorney
representation and appointment of counsel for in-
digents at revocation in general. As indicated in
Table 4, almost all parole boards permit attorneys
at the hearings and a majority routinely provide















Yes No* Applicable Total
47 5 - 52
25 22 5 52
50 2 - 52
29 21 2 52
*No includes those cases where attorneys are permitted or
appointed only if the parolee meets the requirements of Gagnon
v. Scarpblli or similar criteria, or where respondents indicated
hat attorneys are not generally permitted at the hearings.
again is a substantial increase over the practices
reported in 1972. As mentioned, thirty-seven
boards permitted attorney representation at that
time. (Information on the appointment of counsel
was not collected in the 1972 survey).
In summary, with one exception, paroling au-
thorities report compliance with those asepcts of
Morrissey and Gagnon included in this survey. Parol-
ing authorities have instituted the two-stage hear-
ing process, and with respect to the preliminary
hearing, they report compliance with the require-
ments of notice, presentation and confrontation of
witnesses, composition of the hearing body and
preparation of a summary of the hearing. Boards
also reported compliance with the requirements of
presentation and confrontation of witnesses at the
final hearing. Information on assistance of counsel,
appointment of counsel, disclosure of evidence
prior to both hearings, and the time period between
arrest and the preliminary hearing suggests that
boards have met those requirements as well. One
item with which boards are not in full compliance
is provision of a written statement of the reasons
and the evidence relied upon for the revocation
decision. All boards report an explanation of the
decision, but in six cases the explanation is verbal
rather than written.
Other Effects of Morrissey and Gagnon
Earlier two related sets of issues were raised with
respect to agency compliance with the Morrissey
and Gagnon rulings. The first concerned increased
costs and the possibility that these costs, combined
with more procedural restrictions, would lead to
fewer paroles. The second issue concerned the pos-
sibility that the requirements of those decisions
would be met by a surface compliance only.
Specific information on increased costs was not
collected. However, there are some indirect mea-
sures which suggest Morrissey did increase the cost
of parole administration. One indication is an in-
crease in personnel allocated to the parole process.
In 1972, twenty-eight boards were full-time, eight-
een part-time, and six were a combination of the
two-chairperson full-time, members part-time. In
1976, thirty boards had become full-time," eight-
een remained part-time, and four were a combi-
nation. Of those four, one had two of its four
members serving full-time in addition to the chair-
person.
The size of parole boards has also increased. In
1972, there were 240 parole board members and
chairpersons in the fifty state parole boards sur-
veyed. In 1976, that number had increased to 259.
Furthermore, there had been an increase in the
number of jurisdictions employing hearing offi-
cers.4 In 1972, only six jurisdictions reported rou-
tinely using hearing officers.46 In 1976, twenty-nine
paroling authorities employed 155 hearing officers.
Although a number of these were personnel who
carried out other duties, such as supervising parole
officers, there has nonetheless been a substantial
increase in the number of personnel available to
conduct hearings.
The evidence is more ambiguous regarding a
decrease in paroles due to the added procedural
requirements. The best data on parole practices in
the United States is gathered by the Uniform
Parole Reports system. Through that system it is
' Hawaii indicated in communications with the staff
of the National Parole Institutes that it anticipated re-
organization into a full-time board within the near future.
" Supra note 40.
46 A few others (exact number unavailable) mentioned
limited use of hearing officers. However, there is no
indication of the formality of those positions, thus limiting
the comparability of the information.
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Table 4
Attorney Representation at Revocation Hearings
1976
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Table 5
UNIFORM PAROLE REPORTS
NUMBER RELEASED, NUMBER PAROLED, AND PERCENT PAROLED
ADULT PRISON AND REFORMATORY RELEASES IN 42 STATES
1965-1974
Year Number Released Number Paroled Percept Paroled
1965 84,803 51,594 61%
1966 82,977 50,200 61%
1967 81,491 49,954 61%
1968 79,644 48,783 61%
1969 79,765 49,608 62%
1970 86,129 52,991 62%
1971 89,863 57,529 64%
1972 95,829 62,917 66%
1973 96,209 62,316 65%
1974 96,438 61,933 64%
Total 873,148 547,825 63%
Table 6
Survey Item
Do you think it is more
difficult to revoke parole
in your state since the
Morrissey decision?
Since the Morie decision,
do you persona ly feel more
reluctant to release "border-
line cases?"
possible to track the degree to which parole was
employed in forty-two states in the ten-year period
between 1965 and 1974.4 7 Table 5 describes these
trends.
The data show an interesting pattern when it is
recalled that the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Morrissey in June, 1972. Up to that year,
the number paroled and the proportion released
by parole (out of the total released through all
methods) had shown a consistent increase since
1968. Then in 1973 and 1974 there was a modest,
but consistent, drop in both the number of persons
paroled and rate of parole. s Whether this de-
creased use of parole is related to Morrissey or other
factors is not known. However, a significant mi-
47 
NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE INSTITUTES,
UNIFORM PAROLE REPORTs-NEWSLETTER (1976).
The reason that only 42 states are listed is that eight
jurisdictions sometime during that period did not report
on all cases.
4s The proportion of parolees returned to prison for
reasons other than conviction of a new felony also de-
clined slightly in 1973 and 1974 according to the UNI-
FORM PAROLE REPORTS, supra note 47. Whether this
decline can be attributed to more stringent due process
requirements, a decline in the number of parolees in
higher risk categories or other factors is impossible to
determine from the data available.
% Don't Know
% Yes % No or No Response
44.8 48.5 6.7
22.1 73.6 4.3
nority of parole board members apparently would
agree that such an association exists. They were
asked two items related to that question on the
Parole Board Opinion Survey. Respondents were asked
if revocation had become more difficult and if they
were more reluctant to release inmates they consid-
ered "borderline" since the Morrissey decision. The
responses, presented in Table 6, indicate that while
board members are fairly evenly divided in their
opinion of the ease or difficulty of revocation since
that decision, the majority (73.6%), feel they are
no more reluctant to release borderline cases than
before the decision. However, 22.1% do indicate an
increased reluctance to parole such cases.
In general the evidence seems to indicate that
there have been increased costs associated with
parole personnel and lawyers in carrying out the
mandate of the Supreme Court. Further, there does
seem to be a modest diminution in the rate and
use of parole since those decisions, a decrease ar-
guably related to Morrissey and Gagnon.
Indirect Measures of Compliance
As earlier suggested, an appearance of compli-
ance is one thing, actual practice may be quite
another. In order to assess the paroling authorities'
[Vol. 69
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Table 7






















a. Four jurisdictions: usually
b.. Three jurisdictions: usually
c. One jurisdiction: usually
acceptance of the Court's intervention, a number
of approaches were used.
One rather direct measure is the use of waiver.
This is a fairly common and effective means of
resistance to procedural regulations. Paroling au-
thorities were asked if they permitted waiver of
either or both of the revocation hearings, and to
estimate, roughly, what percentage of parolees uti-
lize waiver. Forty-five of the fifty-two boards sur-
veyed permit waiver of the preliminary hearing,
while only about half permit waiver of the final
hearing.
As Table 7 demonstrates, the extent of waiver is
not consistently high for the preliminary hearing
and is considerably lower for the final revocation
hearing. The higher incidence of waiver of the
preliminary hearing in both policy and practice
may indicate evasion of the Morrissey ruling in some
jurisdictions. However, large scale waiver attempts
of the type feared do not seem to have emerged.
An additional method of undermining the intent
of the Court is to institute policies which effectively
negate the procedural requirements. One item in-
cluded in both surveys of parole practices con-
cerned the routineness of revocation for those con-
3c 49 521 51 52
victed of a new felony or misdemeanor. Such a
policy might serve to evade the substance of Mor-
rissey and Gagnon by making whatever hearings
were held in those cases mere formalities. However,
as Table 8 demonstrates, there has been a slight
decrease in the number of boards that routinely
revoke under those circumstances.
In addition, information on the attitudes of pa-
role authority members with respect to Morrissey
and Gagnon was collected in the Parole Board Member
Opinion Survey. Respondents were asked to rate the
positive or negative effect of those decisions on
parole in their jurisdictions. Table 9 presents the
opinions of board members and chairpersons con-
cerning selected elements of the Morrissey decision.
Clearly the majority of respondents assessed the
value of the specific elements of Morrissey listed in
Table 9 as positive. Further, when these board
members were asked to rate the overall value of the
decision in terms of its effect on parole in their
state, the results were again favorable. Fully 62.6%
of the respondents rated the effect of the decision
as positive, while 27.0% rated the effect as neutral,
and 4.9% rated the effect as negative (5.5% did not
respond).
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Allowing the parolee to
present individuals and
evidence in his favor
Allowing the parolee to
confront individuals who
have supplied information
adverse to his case
Conducting a second, final
hearing
Allowing the returned
parolee to present indi-
viduals and evidence in
his behalf
Stating the evidence
relied upon and the
reasons for the decision
Table 9
Board Opinion Survey
Elements of Morrissey Decision
Percentage Responses 49
No
Positive Neutral Negative Response
79.7 15.3 2.4 2.5
76.1 17.8 4.3 1.8
58.9 25.2 12.9 3.1
68.7 15.3 12.8 3.1
68.8 17.8 9.2 4.3
88.4 8.6 1.8 1.2
Table 10









Board members also favored attorney represen-
tation. As indicated in Table 10, the majority of
respondents supported the presence of counsel at
the revocation hearings. Interestingly, when re-
spondents were asked to indicate their assessment
of the effect of attorney presence on the revocation
decisions, the majority, 59.5%, indicated that at-
torney presence has "little effect one way or an-
other," 24.5% rated the presence of counsel as
49The original scale ranged from 1) Very Positive to
5) Very Negative. For ease of presentation, the scale has
been collapsed; points 1) and 2) have been designated
"Positive," point 3) "Neutral," and points 4) and 5)
"Negative."
50 The original five-point scale ranged from "Definitely
Should" to "Definitely Should Not." For presentation,
"Definitely Should" and "Preferably Should" have been
designated "Should;" "Definitely Should Not" and
"Preferably Should Not" as "Should Not;" while the
central category, "May or May Not," has been re-labeled
"Neutral."
Percentage of Responses 50
Should No
hould Neutral Not Response
73.6 15.3 10.4 .6
70.0 15.3 13.5 1.2
"helpful" and 9.2% as a "hindrance," (6.7% failed
to respond).
Summary and Conclusion
It would appear overall that paroling authorities
have complied with Morrissey and Gagnon. With few
exceptions, the fifty-two adult boards surveyed re-
ported practices consistent with those elements of
the decisions included in the questionnaire.
Clearly, one should be cautious about accepting a
self report study, such as this, as a totally satisfac-
tory basis for obtaining an accurate picture of
"reality." Undoubtedly there are individual board
members, and perhaps even parole boards, who
seek to avoid or subvert the implementation of
Morrissey and Gagnon. But personal and fairly close
contacts that the writers had with about 150 parole
board members during a series of training sessions,
conducted at the same time that the nationwide
questionnaires were being administered, lends a
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good deal of support to a view that compliance
with Morrissey and Gagnon was general and full.
Beyond this, none of the indirect measures sup-
ports the concerns of those who predicted wide-
spread evasion of the rulings. While the limitations
of the data prevent a final conclusion, most parole
boards report reasonable use of waiver and a de-
cline in the number of automatic revocation poli-
cies following conviction for a new offense. Boards
also appeared to expand the rulings of the courts
in some areas, such as a general provision for
attorney representation at revocation.
Finally, there is evidence from the opinion survey
that movement in the direction of greater due
process protection in parole is supported by a
significant group of board members. The majority
of respondents to that survey rated the elements of
both Morrissey and Gagnon as having a favorable, or
at least neutral impact on the revocation process
and decision.
The survey of parole practices did yield indirect
evidence of increased costs in shifts from part-time
to full-time boards, an increase in board size, and
the addition of personnel in the form of hearing
officers. Data also suggests there has been some
decline in the use of parole since the holdings of
the Supreme Court with a small but significant
number (22%) of board members feeling more
reluctant to parole questionable cases than before
the decisions.
Why were the parole boards so quick to comply
with the Court's mandate when other Court deci-
sions met with resistance? Several items differen-
tiate parole board activities from other agency
matters affected by court decisions. The first has to
do with the position of the agency. Unlike the
police orjuvenile courts, parole boards tend to be
highly centralized agencies, thus reducing the dis-
tance between administrative and line personnel
and easing the difficulty of implementing uniform
procedures. Their position also makes their activi-
ties more visible than are the proceedings of nu-
merous juvenile courts or the behavior of individ-
ual police officers.
Secondly, revocation is often viewed as evidence
of the failure of the system, and particularly of the
parole system. It is in the interest of the parole
board and agency to keep revocation rates as low
as community safety permits. Procedural regula-
tions could not threaten the system with increased
revocation rates, and might provide an excuse for
late revocation.
Finally, unlike the juvenile courts, who saw large
segments of their discretion curtailed by the pro-
cedural requirements of Gault,51 or the police whose
professional behavior became subject to court re-
view due to Mapp 2 and Miranda,5 the discretion of
parole boards was left largely intact by Morrissey
and Gagnon. Both this autonomy, and the availa-
bility of adequate funds to administer the new
standards, go a long way to explaining the substan-
tial compliance reflected in this survey.
o The original five-point scale ranged from "Definitely
Should" to 'Definitely Should Not." For presentation,
"Definitely Should" and "Preferably Should" have been
designated "Should;" "Definitely Should Not" and
"Preferably Should Not" as "Should Not;" while the
central category, "May or May Not," has been re-labeled
"Neutral."
6' 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
52 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
